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ABSTRACT 
 
It is often stated that the public sector should be separated from politics and that an isolated bu-
reaucracy, in this sense, is less prone to corruption. The cornerstone of such propositions is that 
the activities of politicians and administrators should be separated so that politicians dominate poli-
cy making, while administrators dominate implementation. This paper investigates if the organiza-
tional characteristics aimed at isolating bureaucrats from politicians are correlated with lower levels 
of corruption in countries across the world. Using a unique dataset measuring features of the public 
sector administration in 97 countries, we show that there is no empirical association between four 
standard indicators of an isolated bureaucracy and low corruption. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corruption is a persistent problem in the world today. This is not only true for developing coun-
tries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, but also for many European democracies such as Italy and 
Greece (for an overview see Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2009). In the academic field of 
Public Administration and in national debates in several countries it has been suggested that cor-
ruption can be curbed by fostering a traditional organization of public administration, guaranteeing 
lifelong careers, formalizing recruitments, and introducing strong legal protection for civil servants. 
This paper scrutinizes these suggestions and demonstrates that they are merely myths of corruption 
prevention.   
 
The consequences of widespread corruption for economic development and social well-being are 
important in several ways. For example, factors related to corruption seem to be more decisive than 
traditional variables in economics for explaining sustained economic growth (Hall and Jones 1999;; 
Mauro 1995;; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004). In addition, corruption has dramatic effects 
on social well-being as it contributes to worse educational attainment, lower levels of health and 
happiness, worse protection of the environment, impoverishment of social and political trust and 
higher levels of violence (Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2009). Therefore, the quest for find-
ing institutional recipes to curb corruption has become a goal for many researchers and policymak-
ers.  
 
Policymakers and academics have, for example, suggested that institutionally isolating public ad-
ministra????? ????? ????????????? ?????????????? ????? ??????????? A group of characteristics that have 
received attention are some fairly narrowly defined components of a Weberian bureaucracy such as 
formalized recruitments of public servants, lifelong tenure and special employment laws for public 
employees.1 A common denominator of these bureaucratic features is that they aim to create a clear 
separation of the activities between public servants and politicians and, therefore, they have tended 
to go hand in hand.  
 
                                                     
1 For a discussion on other characteristics of a Weberian ideal-type of bureaucracy, see Olsen 2006; Evans and Rauch 
1999; Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 2011a. The particular bureaucratic characteristics studied in this paper belong 
????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
100) define as the Neo-Weberian State (NWS). Since NWS is a concept difficult to operationalize ? scholars admit it is 
an omega concept and thus vague and incomplete (Pollit and Bouckaert 2004, 100-102; Ongaro 2008, 113) ? we focus 
our analysis on the individual characteristics for which we have measurements. 
 4 
The result is that we have some countries with more isolated bureaucracies than others. In studies 
mainly of OECD countries, scholars have noted ?? ????????? ???????? ???? ??????? ?????? ???? ????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????gium, Spain) (Auer at al. 1996). 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????y-
ees, although they often develop large bodies of politically appointed advisors instead (Peters and 
Painter 2010). Staff policy is in these countries often firmly controlled by autonomous administra-
tive corps of civil servants, with recruitments made through formal examinations and life tenure 
guaranteed for those who pass those exams (Bekke and Van der Meer 2000;; Heady 1996). In the 
?????????????????? ???????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
not enjoy special employment laws, life tenure is less frequent, and public employees resemble their 
private-sector counterparts more. 
 
Before moving on, a word of caution is in order regarding this classification of national bureaucra-
cies. As Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell (2011b) has shown, characterizing public administrations 
as closed or open is mainly meaningful for Western and post-communist countries. In other parts 
of the world these different aspects of staff policy do not cluster together in the same way as in 
Europe. This paper therefore treats the four components of an isolated bureaucracy, for which 
measurements are available, separately (these are salaries, recruitments, tenure and employment 
laws).  
 
This paper makes two contributions. First, we argue that one should make a distinction between 
two different ways in which politics and administration can be isolated from each other. Different 
arrangements can separate careers of politicians and administrators, or separate their activities. We 
explain why one should expect different effects on corruption, depending on which of these ar-
rangements is dominant. Another paper in which both authors of this paper have participated 
(Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 2011a), show a systematic positive effect of arrangements sepa-
rating careers. In particular, that study notes a strong and significant effect of meritocratic recruit-
ment to the administration, which is robust to stringent controls, such as the inclusion of the most 
prevailing institutional explanations like the form of government or the characteristics of the elec-
toral system. 
 
We do, however, know less about the effects of separating the activities of politicians and adminis-
trators, which leads us to the other, and maybe most important contribution of this paper. The 
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paper empirically analyses the effects on corruption of four characteristics associated with admin-
istrations that separate the activities of politicians and administrators, using a unique dataset based 
on a survey covering the administration structure of 97 countries. The empirical analysis demon-
strates that these characteristics are not linked with low corruption, as traditionally alleged by the 
defenders of a closed bureaucracy.  
 
The policy implications are thus relevant for any government interested in tackling systematic cor-
ruption: unlike the frequent interpretation of a Weberian bureaucracy as one that establishes a 
??????? ???????etween the activities of politicians and administrators, we claim that that stark line 
should instead be established between their careers, making difficult for bureaucrats to become 
elected politicians and vice versa.2     
The bureaucratic dinosaur is back 
There is a long list of explanations for corruption levels and the quality of public institutions resort-
ing to differences in cultural values, economic development or political institutions (for an overview 
see Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2009). In the empirical section we will include one indica-
tor from each of these as control variables. However, the main contribution of this paper is not to 
offer a comprehensive explanatory model. Instead, our focus is on scrutinizing an explanation that 
has gained attention from both academics and policy makers, namely the institutional design of 
public administration.  
 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
known theory of Protestant work ethics and B?????????? ??????? ??????? ??? ???????? ?????????? ???
Southern Europe are both classical examples of culture-based explanations for understanding the 
divergence performances of countries. Also more recent studies, focusing on differences in quality 
of government, have underlined the importance of cultural or religious values (e.g. Putnam 1993, 
La Porta et al. 1999, Treisman 2000, 2007).  
 
These studies do however present problems that encourage more institutional approaches. First, 
cultural factors are difficult to falsify, and, as some authors have noted, it is not intellectually satisfy-
                                                     
2 ??????????? ?????? ????? ????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????? ???????erian or Wilsonian idea-type of bu-
reaucracy (for a recent review of this view, see Lewis 2008, following Weber 1946, 95 and Wilson 1887, 210). The stark 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????onal administra-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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ing to argue that people act in a corrupt fashion simply because they lack morals (Erlingsson, Bergh 
and Sjölin 2008, 600). Second, even the most sophisticated empirical analysis showing that 
Protestant countries exhibit lower levels of corruption fail to provide causal mechanisms (La Porta 
et al. 1999, Treisman 2007). Third, cultural explanations of corruption and quality of government 
suffer from the problem of reverse causality. One cultural factor often considered key for explain-
ing good institutions is the degree of generalized trust, or social capital, especially after ???????? 
(1993) influential study of the differences between Northern and Southern Italy. As recent theoreti-
cal and empirical developments suggest, the direction of the causation could however be the other 
way around (Rothstein and Stolle 2008).  
 
This is also the problem of authors ? such as Welzel and Inglehart (2008) ? emphasizing the im-
portance of economic development for understanding why some democracies perform better in 
terms of governance. It can be argued, echoing the main prediction of classical modernization theo-
ries, that increasing levels of economic development lead to higher demands from voters and, as a 
result, higher quality of government. There are however an extensive and growing literature show-
ing that the causal relationship arrow also goes in the opposite direction: the countries that are 
more capable of curbing corruption grow faster (see Mauro 1995 for an earlier test;; see also Rodrik, 
Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004).    
 
If we move to political institutions, it has been suggested that democracies, where incumbents are 
directly accountable via elections, should outperform unaccountable autocracies in curbing corrup-
tion. However, empirical evidence in favour of the democratic hypothesis is, at best, mixed 
(Holmberg and Rothstein 2010). Numerous scholars have explored what Harris-White and White 
(1996, p. 3) and Sung (2004, p. 179) define as the ??????????????????????????????????????emocracy 
and corruption and concluded that corruption increases in transitional countries and that new de-
mocracies only after a consolidation process are able to effectively curb corruption. 
In sum, we will control for the main cultural variable according to the literature (i.e. the degree of 
?????????????????? ???? ?????? ??? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ????????? ??????? ?ogether 
with the most explored political factor (i.e. the level of democracy in a country). 
 
The main focus of this paper is, however, the public administration structure, which is a factor 
traditionally overlooked by the literature on corruption. Recent studies have provided increasing 
evidence pointing towards the importance of bureaucratic institutions vis-à-vis the conventionally 
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examined political institutions for understanding corruption differences (Dahlström, Lapuente, 
Teorell 2011a;; Rauch and Evans 2000;; Olsen 2006). As Olsen (2005, 1) puts it;; Weberian bureau-
??????????????? ????? ????????? ??rganizational dinosaur helplessly involved in its death strug??????
Instead, ????????? ??????????????????????????????????????Nevertheless, as noted by numerous scholars, 
a Weberian bureaucracy may mean many different things and, in principle, it contains a large num-
ber of characteristics that potentially may have very different effects (Hall 1963;; Olsen 2008).   
 
In this paper we focus on one core principle of a Weberian bureaucracy, namely the idea of separat-
ing the political sphere from the administrative sphere within public organisations.3 This principle 
was the corner-stone of the British Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1853, which is considered as the 
founding text of the modern meritocratic administration in the western world (Mouritzen and Svara 
2002, 3).4 For the purpose of this paper it should be noted that already at that point in time these 
reforms aimed at tackling the extensive corruption, patronage and nepotism, in Britain known as 
????????????????? 
The separation between politics and administration is also of essential concern for the two authors 
most frequently cited in the literature on administrative systems, namely Max Weber (1978), who 
underlined the necessity of having a civil service that was politically independent, and Woodrow 
Wilson (1887), who advocated the establishment of a separate sphere for public administration. The 
idea of a strong bureaucracy that acts as a counter-weight to the power of a democratic majority is 
also prevailing in the current scholarship. Garry Miller (2000, 325) ???????????????????????????????
order to be efficient (...) governments should establish mechanisms which constrain, and not only 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
Separating activities or careers? 
In spite of the consensus about the beneficial effects of separating politics and administration, it is 
much less apparent how administration and politics should be separated and what effects the dif-
ferent ways of institutionalising such a separation have. Very schematically, politics and administra-
tion can be separated in two different ways, which potentially can produce very different outcomes. 
We call it (i) the separation of activities and (ii) the separation of careers.  
                                                     
3 Therefore, similar to scholars in this administrative literature (Rauch and Evans 2000), we do not explore other hypo-
thetically important principles long associated with a Weberian bureaucracy, such as the standardization of procedures 
or its hierarchical character.  
4 The contemporary discussions in other European countries were very similar and, for instance, the Spanish Prime 
Minister Bravo Murillo, himself familiar with the probl??????????????????????????? ?????????????? ??? ???????????????? ??? ? 
unsuccessfully ? to separate the political and administrative spheres in Spain via a Decree in 1852 (Lapuente 2007). 
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We will use the example of the main administrative figure in Western local governments to illus-
trate the difference between the separation of activities and the separation of careers because this 
figure travels well and has been subject to some comprehensive large-N comparative studies 
(Mouritzen and Svara 2002). The literature refers to this figure as the Chief Administrative Officer 
(CAO) because of its resemblance with the Chief Executive Officer (see Mouritzen and Svara 2002, 
8). In the classic metaphor of good local governance offered by Peter Self (1972), the separation of 
politics and administration at the local level can be imagined as an arch, at whose apex the chief 
administrative figure (CAO)5 and the chief political figure (the council leader or the mayor) cohabit. 
Yet the same figure plays a quite different role in what otherwise may be relatively similar local 
entities.  
 
For instance, Spain is a country with strict separation of the activities of elected politicians and 
CAOs. Mayors and councillors monopolize policy decision-making while the secretarios-interventores 
do not take active part in the decision-making process. Their involvement is more restricted to a 
passive role, as they mainly check the legal validity of the decisions by an all-political local execu-
tive. This is also the main purpose of local CAOs in other countries within the Napoleonic admin-
istrative tradition, such as France, Italy or Portugal.  
 
On the contrary, in countries with local governments organized according to what we call here the 
separation of careers principle, such as in the Nordic countries, CAOs play a more active role in 
policy-making and management. Local CAOs may even launch their own policy initiatives as well 
as providing policy proposals elected representatives. The political neutrality of these local CAOs 
does not ? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ssionally 
and morally obliged to furnish their political leaders with alternative policies which can be devel-
???????Asmeron and Reis 1996, 8). However, different formal and informal mechanisms prevent 
bureaucrats in countries organized after the separation-of-careers principle from engaging in politi-
                                                     
5 Examples of a CAO would be the city-managers of the Anglo-Saxon world, the Swedish kommunchef, the Finnish 
Kommundirektör, the segretari comunali in Italy, or the secretario-interventor in Spain. 
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cal activities themselves and, particularly, from running for offices (Dahlström and Lapuente 2010), 
while the opposite often occurs in countries organized after the separation-of-activities principle 
(for example in France and Spain).   
 
The separation-of-careers principle does thus not separate political and bureaucratic activities or 
responsibilities, but almost the contrary. T???? ?????????? ??????? ????????????? ????? ?????? ??fferent 
interests, some motivated by political re-election and others by their careers as professional manag-
ers, to take policy decisions together. 
 
By contrast, the separation-of-activities principle emphasises the need to keep CAOs as separated 
as possible from the activities undertaken by elected representatives. CEOs are in such ma model 
limited to a passive role in policy-making. Therefore, all relevant policy-making and managerial 
activities fall in the hands of a team of individuals with a shared fate, namely the elected officials of 
the ruling party and their political advisors.  
 
In settings where the careers of politicians and administrators are separated, CAOs act as a political 
brake on the party interests of the elected representatives in terms of, for example, giving greater 
consideration to the long-term objectives of public policies (Mouritzen and Svara 2002, 8).6 There 
are empirical indications of positive effects on local government of having two leaders that ac-
countable to different groups ? the elected representative and the CAO ? working in tandem. The 
tension derived from the division of political activity between agents with such different interests 
has thus a healthy impact in terms of good governance, and permits a more balanced formulation 
of public policies. 
 
Going beyond local governments, and looking at the general organization of public administrations 
in 52 countries, Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell (2011a) argue that making professionals who 
respond to different chains of accountability work close together, creates a coordination problem in 
case they want to engage in corrupt activities. This means that when elected politicians are account-
able to the party and public managers are accountable to professional peers have less margin for 
                                                     
6 More on CAOs: How does a USA city manager ??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
(Mouritzen and Svara ????????????????????????????????? ?????? ???? ?whistleblower?? ????????????????????????????????u-
??????????????????????whistleblower???????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????tatives. 
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opportunistic behaviour. According to the same study, public administrations with such characteris-
tics are empirically associated with low levels of corruption.  
 
Keeping different career interests in the two groups of professionals (politicians and bureaucrats) at 
the apex of leadership of a local government, or, more generally, of any public administration is 
thus a deterrent of power abuse or corruption. In other words, the antidote against corruption and 
malfeasance in public office is to have individuals with different interests jointly taking the same 
decisions.   
 
Four ways of separating the activities of politicians and administrators  
Paradoxically, most policy recommendations for curbing corruption through administrative design 
do however not aim at creating a separation of the careers of politicians and bureaucrats but rather 
separating their activities. In short, politicians should monopolise decision-making activities while 
bureaucrats isolated fro?????????????????????????????????????????????????????-implementation. The 
former should not get involved in the activities of the latter and vice versa. This paper identifies 
four widespread recommendations aimed at separating activities of politicians and bureaucrats that 
will subsequently be tested empirically. 
 
The first recommendation is that a traditional public management organization does consolidate a 
more effectively isolated bureaucracy than a New Public Management (NPM) organization, since 
the latter is based on the idea that politicians may introduce incentives (e.g. performance-related 
payments instead of flat salaries) to make bureaucrats more accountable to their wishes. A prevail-
ing argument in the literature on corruption is that NPM reforms open windows of opportunity for 
corruption. This would happen even in countries with high levels of quality of government. As 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????spect that retrench-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????? is that 
the principle of legality is the ruling principle in the traditional public management organisation, 
while the principle of efficiency takes priority in a more NPM-oriented public sector (for a review 
of the literature on Spanish corruption cases, see Lapuente 2009). It is argued that the greater flexi-
bility associated with NPM reforms and lack of administrative procedures that guarantee the prin-
ciple of legality create opportunities for partial and/or corrupt policy decisions. For instance, a 
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politician who wants to favour cronies in public procurement may create NPM-based agencies that 
more directly accountable to her.  
 
The other three recommendations steam from the idea that careers in the public sector should be 
isolated from private market flexibilities in order to create the best opportunities for impartial im-
????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????ntrast to the 
??????? ??? ?????????-??????? public administration system. In such systems recruitments, careers 
and exits of public employees are firmly controlled and often formalized (Bekke and Van der Meer 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ations (Au-
er et al. 1996) the public sector resembles the private sector more.  
 
????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????
(1992) Managerial Dilemmas the beneficial effects at medium-long term of strategies based on long-
term employment commitments are shown. Yet, aut?????????????????????????????????? ??????????s-
tem go a step further in demanding almost total guarantees of job security in what, de facto, be-
comes life tenure for public employees. This is a key characteristic of the civil service status granted 
to the bul?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????funcionario or fonction-
naire). For some administrative scholars, the closed public administration system would obey to a 
more sophisticated conception of civil service than the open system because it involves life tenure 
and a step-by-step promotion based on seniority. In addition, civil servants achieve a maximum 
knowledge of the organization (Gutiérrez Reñón 1987, 66).  
 
The positive views of a closed public administration system are common in the European academ-
ia. For instance, the German autonomous public administration system ???????????????????????????
??? ??????????? ?????? ????????????? ???? ???? ?????????????? ?????????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ???????????
(Meininger 2000, 189). At the same time, attempts in some countries, like Spain, to introduce ele-
??????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????Crespo Montes 2001, 114). Moving towards a more open public 
administration would thus result in less efficient public organizations as well as create more oppor-
tunities for corruption. This is also the conventional view among public opinion leaders in many 
countries. For example, the major Spanish newspaper, El País, voiced its opposition to those ele-
ments of the new Civil Service Act that have tried to replace rigid employment arrangements with 
more flexible private-sector-like conditions in local governments (Iglesias 2007, 127).  
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The argument for an isolated bureaucracy with firmly regulated recruitments, careers and exits in 
the public sector is thus that they limit the ad hoc flexibility of private-sector-like contracts. The 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????tment 
via anonymous formal examination systems which eliminate the subjectivity (and thus, the oppor-
tunities for nepotism) that the private sector-like conventional procedures (e.g. screening of CVs, 
face-to-face job interviews) allow;; a guaranteed secure tenure, which prevents political superiors 
from removing inconvenient public employees;; and special labour laws ? different from the general 
labour laws covering private sector workers ? protecting public employees and limiting the possibil-
ities for punishing public employees by firing them.  
 
In sum, four hypotheses can be derived from this view of a Weberian bureaucracy as separation of 
politicians and bureaucrats: (i) The first hypothesis is that NPM oriented public sectors are associ-
ated with higher corruption levels. (ii) The second hypothesis is that formal examinations when 
recruiting public employees are associated with lower corruption levels. (iii) The third hypothesis is 
that lifelong careers for public employees are associated with lower corruption levels. (iv) The forth 
hypothesis is that the existence of special employment laws for the public sector is associated with 
lower corruption levels. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to the empirical test of these 
four hypotheses.  
Method and data 
In the empirical section we investigate the relationship between four ways of creating a separation 
of activities between politicians and public administrators (traditionally organized public sector, 
formalized recruitment to the public sector, lifelong careers and special labour laws for the public 
sector) on the one hand and corruption on the other, in 97 countries around the world. The meth-
od we use is very straightforward. We start by looking at simple correlations between the four indi-
cators and levels of corruption, illustrating the relationships with scatterplots. We carry on by em-
ploying cross-section OLS with a minimum amount of control variables. We include three control 
variables in the regression from the spheres discussed in the theoretical section;; one cultural (Prot-
estantism), one political (level of democracy) and one economical (log of GDP per capita). 
 
On the dependent side, the corruption level, we rely on the Corruption Perceptions Index from 
2010. This is a widely used aggregate corruption measure, ranking countries according to the cor-
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ruption level in the public sector and provided by Transparency International. 178 countries are 
ranked on a scale from 10 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). CPI 2010 brings together data from 13 
different data sources from 10 different institutions for a time period of two years. The bulk of 
these sources are based on perceptions from either country experts or business leaders (Transpar-
ency International 2010, 15).  
 
On the independent side we use a unique comparative data set on the structure of public admin-
istration. The data is produced by the Quality of Government survey (from here on the QoG-
survey). This is a country expert survey completed by 973 public administration experts from a total 
of 126 countries. The data has been collected in two different waves, one running from September 
2008 to May 2009 and the other running from March to November 2010. In this paper we use a 
merged data set, combining both waves. The number of respondents per country in the QoG-
survey varies from 1 to 28, with a mean of 8. However, in order to enhance data quality we only 
include the 97 countries for which at least 3 expert responses have been obtained (for a more de-
tailed discussion see Dahlberg et al. 2011;; and Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 2011b). 
 
We use four different indicators from the QoG-survey, one for each of the four hypothesis de-
scribed in the previous section. The first, the NPM orientation of the public sector, is measured 
through a question where experts rank the degree to which salaries of public sector employees are 
linked to appraisals of their performance, on a scale from 1 (hardly ever) to 7 (almost always). Table 
1 reports the exact wording of all questions used in this paper. 
 
Although NPM is a broad concept including much more than performance-related pay for public 
sector employees, it should be uncontroversial that performance-related pay is a core element of 
NPM, as it exemplifies a new component in rewarding systems not present in traditional public 
administration (Dahlström and Lapuente 2010;; Peters and Hood 2004;; Thompson 2007). The de-
gree of performance-related pay in the public sector should thus give a good indication of the de-
gree of NPM. The second indicator we employ relates to how commonly used formal examinations 
are when public sector employees are hired, again going from 1 (hardly ever) to 7 (almost always). 
The third indicator is a question on how frequent it is that one stays as a public sector employee for 
????????????????????????????e recruited, again measured from 1 (hardly ever) to 7 (almost always). 
The forth indicator comes from a question relating to the regulation of public employees. More 
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specifically, it asks if public sector employees are regulated by special laws that do not apply to pri-
vate sector employees, on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a very large extent). 
 
TABLE 1, INDICATORS OF THE DEGREE OF NPM, FORMAL EXAMINATIONS, LIFELONG CAREERS 
AND SPECIAL LABOUR LAWS FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
Indicator of: 
 
Question 
 
Scale 
 
Degree of NPM 
 
The salaries of public sector employees 
are linked to the appraisals of their perfor-
mance? 
 
1 (hardly ever) 
7 (almost always) 
 
Formalization of recruitments 
 
Public sector employees are hired via a 
formal examination system? 
 
1 (hardly ever) 
7 (almost always) 
 
 
Career tenure  
 
Once one is recruited as a public sector 
employee, one stays a public sector em-
ploy??????????????????????????areer? 
 
 
1 (hardly ever) 
7 (almost always) 
 
 
Special labour laws  
 
The terms of employment for public sector 
employees are regulated by special laws 
that do not apply to private sector employ-
ees? 
 
1 (not at all) 
7 (to a very large extent) 
 
Comment: Questions are from the QoG-survey (see Dahlberg et al.; Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 2011b). 
 
As already mentioned we use three control variables. First, on the cultural side, we use a control for 
the proportion of Protestants in the population 1980, from La Porta et al. (1999). Second, on the 
political side, we control for the level of democracy that is taken from Freedom House and Polity 
(from 2002-2006 varying for different countries).7 Third, relating to economic development, we 
control for logged GDP per capita, from the United Nations Statistics Divisions (2009). All control 
variables are taken from the Quality of Government data set (Teorell et al. 2010). 
 
Results 
A prevailing argument in the literature on corruption is that NPM reforms open windows of op-
portunity for corruption, and that a traditionally organized public sector has stronger legal mecha-
nisms and more routines for preventing corruption (Andersson and Erlingsson 2010). Previous 
literature thus suggests that we should find a negative relation between the degree of NPM and the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (remember that lower values in the Corruption Perceptions Index 
indicate more corruption). 
                                                     
7 We use the Freedom House/Polity version, which has imputed values for countries where data on Polity is missing by 
regressing Polity on the average Freedom House measure (see Hadenius and Teorell 2005). 
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When we examine the situation from a comparative perspective it does however become hard to 
blame the new organisational modes of the NPM for corruption. Consider figure 1, which reports 
the degree of performance-related pay (our NPM measure) on the X-axis and the Corruption Per-
ceptions Index on the Y-axis. The correlation between performance-related pay in the public sector 
and the Corruption Perceptions Index is positive, and not negative as suggested in the literature. 
The correlation is also fairly strong (0.42). Countries with a high score in the Corruption Percep-
tions Index are thus in several cases those that have adopted more NPM reforms. Finland, New 
Zealand, and the UK are for example often considered as forerunners in terms of NPM reforms, 
while countries such as Spain, France ??????????????????????????????????????????(Hood 1996;; Pollit 
and Boukaert 2004;; OECD 2004, Dahlström and Lapuente 2010). 
  
FIGURE 1, PERFORMANCE RELATED PAY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND CORRUPTION
 
Comment: The Y-axis shows the level of corruption on a scale from 10 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). Data comes from the 
Corruption Perception Index 2010 provided by Transparency International (2010). The X-axis reports the degree to which 
salaries of public sector employees are linked to appraisals of their performance on a scale from 1 (hardly ever) to 7 (almost al-
ways). Data comes from the QoG-survey.  
 
ARG
AUS
AUT
BEL
BWA
CAN
CHL
CHN
TWN
CRI
DNK
ECU
EST
FIN
FRA
HUN
ISL
IDN
ITA
JAM
JPN
KGZ
LVA
LTU
MYS
MLT
MOZ
NPL
NLD
NZL
NIC
NOR
RUS
SVK
SWE
CHE
TUR
EGY
GBR
USA
URY
UZB
VEN2
4
6
8
10
C
or
ru
pt
io
n 
Pe
rc
ep
tio
n 
In
de
x
1 2 3 4 5 6
Performance Related Pay
 16 
The first column in table 2 reports the regression coefficients when we examine the same hypothe-
sis but take into account that the relationship could have been suppressed by cultural, political or 
economic factors. Including the control variables does however not seem to change anything in 
substantive terms. The performance-related pay coefficient is positive also when the controls are 
included. It is however not statistically significant. We are therefore unwilling to draw any conclu-
sions from the positive correlation between the degree of performance-related pay and the Corrup-
tion Perceptions Index, but the results clearly indicate that there is no negative relationship as sug-
gested before.   
 
TABLE 2, FOUR INDICATORS OF A CLOSED PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ANC CORRUPTION 
  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
Performance Related Pay 
 
0.146 
(0.125) 
   
 
Formal Examination System 
  
0.070 
(0.082) 
  
 
Lifelong Careers 
   
0.070 
(0.082) 
 
 
Special Employment Laws 
   
 
 
-0.117 
(0.159) 
 
Level of Democracy  
 
0.067 
(0.047) 
 
0.065 
(0.047) 
 
0.065 
(0.047) 
 
0.068 
(0.047) 
 
Protestantism 
 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
 
0.026*** 
(0.005) 
 
0.026*** 
(0.005) 
 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
 
Log (GDP/Capita) 
 
0.999*** 
(0.096) 
 
1.014*** 
(0.095) 
 
1.014*** 
(0.095) 
 
1.029*** 
(0.095) 
 
Constant 
 
-4.659*** 
(0.661) 
 
-4.677*** 
(0.694) 
 
-4.677*** 
(0.694) 
 
-3.798*** 
(1.081) 
 
Number of Countries 
 
91 
 
91 
 
91 
 
91 
 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.798 
 
0.797 
 
0.796 
 
0.796 
Comment: Data for Performance Related Pay, Formal Examination Systems, Lifelong Careers and Special Employment Laws are meas-
ured on a scale from 1 to 7 and come from the QoG-survey (Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 2011b). Level of democracy is taken from 
Freedom House and Polity (from 2002-2006 varying for different countries). Protestantism is measured as the proportion of Protestants in 
the population in 1980 and is from La Porta et al. (1999). Data on GDP per capita are from the United Nations Statistics Divisions (2009).  
*** significant < .01-level 
 
One important argument for formalized recruitments to the public sector is that anonymous formal 
examinations limit the opportunities for nepotism and politicization of public sector positions. 
More informal recruitments resemble the private sector, since positions are open for competition 
and filled with the most suitable candidate, often resorting to private-sector-like recruitment sys-
tems such as screening CVs and personal interviews. The basic idea is that an informal system is 
more easily manipulated and should therefore offer more opportunities for corrupt behaviour and, 
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maybe more importantly, create close ties between politicians and administrators. Figure 2 reports 
how common it is that a public sector employee is recruited via formal examinations on the X-axis, 
and scores on the Corruption Perceptions Index on the Y-axis. If the hypothesis from previous 
literature is right, the relationship between formal examinations and the Corruption Perceptions 
Index should be positive. As is evident from Figure 2, the correlation is however close to zero 
(0.02), indicating that the two phenomena are unrelated.  
 
FIGURE 2, FORMAL EXAMINATION SYSTEM AND CORRUPTION 
 
Comment: The Y-axis shows the level of corruption on a scale from 10 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). Data comes from the 
Corruption Perception Index 2010 provided by Transparency International (2010). The X-axis reports how common it is that 
formal examinations are used when public sector employees are being hired on a scale from 1 (hardly ever) to 7 (almost always). 
Data comes from the QoG-survey.  
 
Column 2 in table 2 reports the results from an OLS-regression including the same three control 
variables as before (democracy, Protestantism and GDP per capita). The regression coefficient for 
formal examinations is positive but the effect is very weak and the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. We therefore are fairly confident that there are no positive relationships between for-
malism in recruitments and low corruption, as suggested in the hypothesis.  
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If we move from aggregate data and look at some specific countries, we find illustrative examples 
of the relatively counter-intuitive result that public employment systems that are more similar to the 
private sector are not more prone to generate corruption. For instance, while face-to-face inter-
views belong to the standard repertoire of selecting public employees in a country like Sweden (a 
country with high CPI score), it has traditionally been rejected as a method for recruiting public 
sector employees in Spain (a country with a lower CPI score). When the Spanish administration 
needs to fill a vacancy th??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
bulletin) of detailed lists of desired characteristics of the would-be civil servants (and the respective 
points assigned to each characteristic). Unlike the Swedish procedure (theoretically more prone to 
subjective considerations), the formalized Spanish mechanism may lead to some ? although hard 
data is unavailable to confirm it ? abuses. For example, some heads of administrations, in order to 
favour their preferred candidate, simply insert some very specific qualifications in the legal job de-
????????????????????????????????????????????Boletín Oficial. These practices of bending the formal 
exam in favour of a preferred candidate are, obviously, very difficult to uncover, let alone to prove 
before a court that a special requirement for a particular post was meant to favour a given candi-
date. Nevertheless, some scholars and civil society organizations have listed many striking cases that 
point towards an intention for nepotism and power abuse. For example, for theoretically standard 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
example points out that also formal recruitment systems are possible to manipulate, which would 
explain why they are not an effective protection against corruption.  
 
The third hypothesis suggests a positive relationship between the length of career tenure for public 
sector employees and the Corruption Perceptions Index. Here the basic idea is that a secure posi-
tion for public employees makes them more autonomous and therefore less dependent on politi-
cians. Some scholars have suggested that a secure position creates an Esprit de Corps within the 
agencies that hampers corruption (Rauch and Evans 2000). 
 
Figure 3 has the degree of career stability on the X-axis and again the Corruption Perceptions Index 
on the Y-axis. There is a weak positive relationship between career stability and the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (0.13). An OLS-regression without any controls shows that the relationship is 
not statistically significant (coefficients not shown). When the three controls discussed earlier are 
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included in the regression, the career variable stays weak and statistically insignificant (reported in 
column 3 in table 2). 
 
 
FIGURE 3, CAREER STABILITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND CORRUPTION 
 
Comment: The Y-axis shows the level of corruption on a scale from 10 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). Data comes from the Corruption 
Perception Index 2010 provided by Transparency International (2010). The X-axis reports how frequent it is that one stays as a public sector 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????e QoG-survey.  
 
Another mean for creating a secure position for public sector employees and isolating them from 
political and public pressure is to have special labour laws for public employees. This has for the 
same reasons as just discussed been considered an efficient way of combating corruption (Cádiz 
Deleito 1987, 113). If we believe this argument, we should expect a positive relationship between to 
what extent public sector employees are regulated by special employment laws and the Corruption 
Perceptions Index. Figure 4 does however report a negative relationship. The correlation is howev-
er only -0.06, and thus very weak. A regression without control variables included shows a statisti-
cally non-significant regression coefficient (not reported). When the same controls as in previous 
analysis are included in the regression the coefficient for special employment laws stays negative 
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and statistically insignificant (see column 4 in table 2). We are therefore reluctant to draw any con-
clusions from the negative relationship but are convinced that there is no positive relationship be-
tween special employment laws and the Corruption Perceptions Index. 
 
FIGURE 4, SPECIAL EMPLOYMENT LAWS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND CORRUPTION
 
Comment: The Y-axis shows the level of corruption on a scale from 10 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). Data comes from the Corruption 
Perception Index 2010 provided by Transparency International (2010). The X-axis reports if public sector employees are regulated by special 
laws that do not apply to private sector employees on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a very large extent). Data comes from the QoG-survey.  
 
There are two potential objections to the results presented in this section. First, characteristics of an 
isolated administrative organization could support each other and only produce the expected ef-
fects when they do so. Second, it is possible that the expected effects only occur at higher levels of 
development or in different parts of the world. In order to check the robustness of our results, we 
have re-run all regressions with an additive index of the four indicators as the independent variable 
(first objection) and divided the sample into four subsamples of OECD/non-OECD-countries and 
EU/non-EU-countries (second objection). There are no substantial changes of the result when we 
use the additive index (results not shown). When we divide our sample into sub-samples the results 
change in two interesting ways. Both speak against the expectation in the literature and strengthen 
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our results. In the OECD sample the positive (non-expected) effect of performance-related pay is 
statistically significant on the .10-level, and the negative (non-expected) effect of career stability is 
statistically significant on the .05-level (results not shown). Since we have a minimum of controls 
and only observe significant results in one of our sub-samples, we are however unwilling to draw 
any conclusions from these unexpected effects.  
 
To sum up, we have been able to contradict the expectations when it comes to the effects of an 
isolated administrative organization on the levels of corruption. We have used four different indica-
tors of bureaucratic isolation and none of them have shown a statistically significant association 
with corruption in the expected direction. 
 
Separate careers, but not separate activities 
It is often stated that the public sector should be protected from politics and that an isolated bu-
reaucracy, in this sense, is less prone to corruption. This paper has tried to uncover the relationship 
between four characteristics of an isolated public administration and levels of corruption across the 
world. It has previously been suggested that i) so-called NPM reforms should introduce more op-
portunities for corruption;; ii) that a formalised recruitment system to the public sector should curb 
corruption;; iii) that long career tenure for public employees should curb corruption;; and iv) that 
strong employment laws for the public sector should limit corruption. Using a dataset including 97 
countries around the world, we have tested these hypotheses. In sum, we show that there is no 
empirical association between any of these characteristics and low corruption.  
 
We believe that two mechanisms explain why isolating the activities of the administration is not an 
efficient tool for curbing corruption. First, there are several examples showing that politicians in 
countries with closed administrative model try to work around the rigidity of administrative proce-
dures by designing at will flexible para-administrative structures (e.g. public companies, foundations, 
and private-public joint ventures) which in-turn may open windows of opportunity for corruption. 
Spain is one such example, but the same can be seen in Belgium and Italy (Cassese 1999;; Dierickx 
2004;; Lapuente 2009). 
 
Second, a strict separation of political and administrative activities between elected officials and 
bureaucratic officials leads to the monopolization of decision-making in the hands of elected offi-
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cials and the implementation details in the hands of bureaucrats, creating opportunities for abuses 
in both types of activities. For instance, in the strict separation of political and administrative activi-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the case with bureaucratic officials in Napoleonic countries such as the Spanish local secretarios, they 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????ex ante or ex post and from the outside, but not during and within the 
decision-making process. 
 
It is plausible to assume that, no matter what external controls decision-makers are subjected to, 
they will always enjoy a margin of manoeuvre for corrupt activities. The reason being that it is logi-
cally impossible to eliminate the residual ? i.e. the opportunity for personal or partisan advantage ? 
that is a part of all policy decisions (Miller and Hammond 1994). The decision-maker always enjoys 
at least some opportunities for taking advantage at the expense of social welfare derived from their 
informational advantages (e.g. how much a bridge ? and all its feasible alternatives ? really costs). 
Similar also to organizational economists (Miller and Falaschetti 2001), this paper considers that it 
is key to create a relative (not absolute, since it would lead to complete gridlock) coordination prob-
lem among decision-makers to minimize the probabilities of opportunistic behaviour. We argue 
that the separation-of-careers model creates such a coordination problem, because we have agents 
responsive to two different chains of accountability (professional peers in the case of bureaucrats;; 
and party fellows in the case of elected officials) forced to jointly take policy decisions. 
 
Instead of creating a coordination problem, closed administrations actually solve the problem by 
dividing politicians and bureaucrats into two independent ? and internally coherent ? groups as-
signed to distinct tasks. The decision-making falls exclusively in the hands of politicians and policy 
implementation in the hands of bureaucrats. In a closed administration, bureaucrats are, at best, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ation, the 
chief administrative officer, the secretario-interventor ?????????????????????????????????????????ting a pub-
lic contract to a private provider) and checks if the formal legal requirements have been met. Yet, 
within the limits of the existing legal framework, local politicians have a wide margin to take their 
most preferred policy decision (e.g. to which private contractor to benefit). In this context, individ-
uals with shared interests (e.g. elected politicians of a given party) unilaterally set the level of the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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In our view the most promising solution is to force people with different interests to take decisions 
involving residual, as in open public administrations. This is, for example, the case in local govern-
ments in Continental and Northern European countries where unelected bureaucrats are involved 
in active policy-??????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????nistrations 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ssional network). As a result, 
favouring some particular citizens or firms, violations of the impartiality rule, and other corrupt 
activities are less likely when individuals with different interests must take policy decisions jointly. 
 
There is also empirical evidence showing that arrangements consistent with the separation of ca-
reers principle curb corruption. This idea is directly tested in Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 
(2011a) and that paper shows that the critical factor separating good performing administrations 
from poorly performing ones is how the selection of public employees takes place: if merit trumps 
personal and political connections, the probability of curbing corruption hugely increases. 
 
Judging from the results presented in this paper and in related papers, policymakers and others 
interested in reducing corruption through administrative design should aim for reforms separating 
the careers, but should not have too high hopes when it comes to the effects of reforms separating 
the activities of politicians and administrators. 
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